I. Introduction
Medicare currently allows beneficiaries to choose between traditional Medicare (TM) and privately administered plans, known as Medicare Advantage (MA). Enrollment in MA has grown rapidly in recent years, now accounting for 31 percent of all beneficiaries and program payments (Kaiser Family Foundation 2015) . There are two distinct policy perspectives on MA (Newhouse and McGuire 2014) . On one hand, MA plans may be better able to encourage physicians and hospitals to manage care appropriately, leading to lower costs and/or better health outcomes. On the other hand, MA plans may avoid enrollment of sicker patients, stint on care for sicker patients once they are enrolled, or incur administrative costs that are disproportionate to their benefits.
Identifying the effects of MA on resource use and quality of care is of first-order importance from the perspective of economics and national fiscal policy. But because enrollment in MA is optional, conventional observational estimates of the program's impact are potentially subject to selection bias. To the extent that beneficiaries who choose MA are unobservably healthier than those who choose TM, conventional estimates of the effect of MA will represent some combination of the program's true causal effect and unobserved differences in its patient population. In addition, there is evidence that the benefits of MA are not limited to its enrollees: at least some of the benefits from MA's management of care spill over to enrollees in TM.
In this paper, we offer a new approach to this problem. We use a discontinuity in the rules governing MA payments to private health plans that gives greater payments to plans that cover beneficiaries who live in counties that are part of metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) with populations of 250,000 or more. The sharp difference in payment rates at this population cutoff creates a greater incentive for plans to reduce premiums and/or increase the generosity of benefits and therefore enroll more beneficiaries in MA in counties just above versus just below the cutoff. The induced incremental enrollment, in turn, allows us to identify the effect of MA on the use of medical services and the quality of care. We find that the expansion of MA on this margin reduces Medicare beneficiaries' rates of hospital use and mortality.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section II provides background on the MA program and a summary of the vast academic literature on the effects of managed care and public versus private provision of health insurance. Section III describes our experimental design in detail and the data that we use to investigate the effects of MA relative to TM. Section IV presents our econometric models and results, and Section V concludes.
II. Medicare Advantage: Background and Previous Literature
The Medicare program has a long history of managed care (see McGuire, Newhouse, and Sinaiko (2011) for an excellent and comprehensive review). Private insurance plans were introduced to Medicare starting in 1985 with the goals of expanding beneficiary choice and transferring to the Medicare program some of the efficiencies thought to have been achieved by managed care plans in the private sector. Enrollment in private Medicare plans has always been, and still is, optional for beneficiaries. Those beneficiaries who choose to enroll in a private plan continue to pay Medicare premiums to the government, equal to about 13 percent of the value of their benefits (CMS 2011, Table I .1). In return, they receive their coverage through (and may pay supplemental premiums to) an MA plan. MA plans receive from Medicare a predetermined monthly payment, adjusted for the demographic characteristics and health status of their enrollees.
A vast empirical literature from the 1990s compared managed care to fee-for-service health plans more generally, and found that managed care enrollees have lower utilization and similar quality, although lower satisfaction, than their fee-for-service counterparts (Miller and Luft 2002; Gottfried and Sloan 2002) . This work set the stage for studies comparing MA to TM.
One set of studies compares the budget cost of MA to that of TM. The finding from this work is clear: MA spends more than would TM to cover a similar set of beneficiaries (MedPAC 2012a). In 2011, for example, MA spent $1.10 for every dollar that would have been spent by TM; in 2012, the comparable figure was $1.07. This is all the more striking since the preponderance of evidence suggests that MA enrollees are on average healthier (MedPAC 2012b).
However, this anomaly is by design. Medicare pays MA plans as a function of a legislatively determined rate called the "benchmark," and benchmarks are on average set well above what it would cost TM to cover a comparable population. The Affordable Care Act (ACA) reduces MA payments, but they will still be more than TM, likely because it is immensely popular with beneficiaries and insurers, both of which benefit from the extra payments (Song, Landrum, and Chernew 2012) .
Thus, these studies leave an important question unanswered: notwithstanding supplemental benefits, what is the effect of MA on the cost and outcomes of care? A second set of studies identifies the effects of MA by using regression methods to compare the use of specific services by beneficiaries in MA versus TM, controlling for observable differences in their demographic and health characteristics. This work generally finds that MA enrollees use fewer services and experience more appropriate use than do their counterparts in TM. For example, Landon et al. (2012) find that MA enrollees have fewer emergency-room visits, ambulatory surgeries, and inpatient admissions than comparable TM enrollees. Other work examines rates of readmission to the hospital Cohen et al. 2012) and rates of admission for outpatient-care-sensitive illnesses (Basu and Mobley 2012) , and finds them to be lower in MA as well.
Researchers have also found significantly lower mortality in MA versus TM (Dowd et al. 2011) . Consistent with the earlier literature about managed care more generally, studies such as Keenan et al. (2009) show that beneficiaries in MA self-report less favorable experiences with Medicare than comparable beneficiaries in TM, although more recent analysis by MedPAC (2012a) suggests that the gap between MA and TM plans on this dimension is shrinking.
These studies have two important limitations. First, they depend on the assumption that enrollees in MA are comparable to those in TM, conditional on observables. Although the extent of favorable selection into MA has declined over time ), this assumption is likely to be incorrect. There is still evidence of favorable selection into MA on the basis of observables, and the model used to adjust payments to MA plans on the basis of observables explains only a fraction of the variation in beneficiaries' use of services (MedPAC 2012b) . Because the unobservable characteristics of beneficiaries are likely positively correlated with the observables, the possibility remains that at least part of the estimated cost and quality advantage of MA over TM is due to unobserved differences in their covered populations rather than the true causal effects of the programs.
Second, a long line of research, starting with Baker (1997) , suggests that the level of managed care enrollment in a geographic market affects treatment patterns in TM. These "spillover" effects occur because managed care's activities may alter how physicians practice medicine for all of their patients. In particular, more recent analysis by Chernew, DeCiccia, and Town (2008) and Baicker and Robbins (2015) finds that increases in area MA enrollment results in reductions in resource use for individuals who remain in TM.
Several recent studies seek to address these two limitations. Baicker, Chernew, and Robbins (2013) estimate the consequences of MA for hospital utilization, including spillovers, with an instrumental variables approach. Their models identify the effects of interest under the assumption that changes in the benchmark, or in a simulated benchmark, affect MA enrollment but are otherwise uncorrelated with TM treatments and costs. They find that increases in county-level MA enrollment lead to shorter hospital stays and lower hospital costs. Although this work makes an important contribution, it does not examine the effect of MA on health outcomes, and depends on assumptions about the exogeneity of changes in Medicare payment policies. Curto et al. (2014) use a structural model to estimate the economic surplus created by Medicare Advantage. They find that MA plans have around 12 percent lower costs than TM, and generate around $50 in surplus per enrollee month. However, because they do not have a direct measure of the costs of service in MA, their estimate of MA's cost advantage and surplus necessarily depends on the assumptions they use to infer the cost of MA.
In this paper, we offer a new approach to identifying the effects of MA on hospital admissions and mortality. We make use of a discontinuity in the benchmark rate on which Medicare's payments to plans are based. In the Benefits Improvement and Protection Act of 2000, Congress established "urban floors": minimum benchmarks, effective in 2001, for MA plans serving beneficiaries in counties that were part of MSAs with populations of 250,000 or more in 2000.
1 Plans in smaller markets were paid lower rates. According to Pope et al. (2006) , urban floors had a major impact on the program, causing plans to expand their benefits and widen their networks, thereby raising enrollment beyond what it would have otherwise been. Cabral, Geruso, and Mahoney (2014) expand on this analysis and quantify the magnitude of the effect of floors on payment rates and premiums. They find that the urban floor increased benchmarks by approximately $50 per month (or between 8.4 and 22.7 percent, depending on counties' initial benchmark rate), and that between 13 and 74 percent of the increase in the benchmark was passed back to beneficiaries in the form of lower premiums, depending on market conditions. Duggan, Starc, and Vabson (2014) also make use of the discontinuity in payment rates at the floor. They report three key findings. First, the fraction of beneficiaries enrolled in Medicare Advantage HMO or PPO plans increases by 7 percentage points as a result of floor-induced payment increases. Second, like Cabral, Geruso, and Mahoney (2014) , they investigate the effect of the floor on premiums and beneficiaries' out-of-pocket costs, and find that only about one-fifth of the floor-induced payment increase was passed back. Third, using data from CAHPS (Consumer Assessment of Healthcare Providers and Systems) and the National Inpatient Sample, they investigate the effect of the floor on quality, and find no significant effects.
Our approach differs from Duggan, Starc, and Vabson (2014) in three important ways. First, we examine the effect of floor-induced changes in enrollment on mortality. Second, our hospital admissions data are more geographically comprehensive and so enable us to estimate the effects of MA with greater power (although whether our data are more or less valid than the National Inpatient Sample used by them is an open question we discuss in greater detail below). Third, their analysis stratifies counties by fee-for-service spending level, which itself might be an outcome of MA enrollment, whereas we take an intent-totreat approach and examine all beneficiaries from all counties around the floor.
Our strategy looks at mortality and hospitalization measures for all beneficiaries in a county. This approach mitigates selection problems (because above-floor counties are similar to below-floor counties at a population level, as we discuss below). Moreover, our approach captures spillover effects if MA affects all beneficiaries through system-wide effects, as the previous literature suggests.
III. Experiment and Data
To understand the nature of our experiment, it is necessary to understand the rules governing payment to MA plans.
2 Plans bid to offer coverage, where the bid is to cover an average beneficiary. Medicare bases its payment to plans on the relationship between the bid and the benchmark (payments to plans are also adjusted for their enrollees' demographics and health). The benchmark is a publicly disclosed, county-level number that is a function of several factors, including the county's average historical spending on TM beneficiaries. If a plan bids above the benchmark, enrollees must pay a premium equal to the difference between the bid and the benchmark. During our study period, if a plan bid below the benchmark, it received a "rebate" from Medicare equal to 75 percent of the difference, which it was required to pass back to beneficiaries in the form of supplemental benefits or premium offsets. Virtually all plans bid below the benchmark, so virtually all enrollees get a rebate (in 2009, 95 percent of plans and 98 percent of enrollees were in plans that bid below the benchmark).
3 Thus the existence of an urban floor in the benchmark rate creates a pseudo-random experiment: beneficiaries in counties subject to the urban floor are more likely to be offered plans with a higher benchmark relative to TM in the area and thus more generous benefits and/or lower premiums. Figure 1 shows how the urban floor affects the benchmark in the 413 counties we study. Of these counties, 278 are part of MSAs with populations between 100,000 and 249,999 (not subject to the urban floor), and 135 are part of MSAs with populations between 250,000 and 400,000 (subject to the urban floor). In counties below the floor, the benchmark ranges from $716 to $1,026; but in counties above the floor, the benchmark ranges from $792 to $1,033. This discontinuous jump in the minimum benchmark translates into an average difference in benchmarks in our sample of $48-almost exactly the difference reported by Cabral, Geruso, and Mahoney (2014) for the set of counties that they study.
F I G U R E 1 . Medicare Advantage benchmark by 2009 MSA population
Note: Counties in MSAs with 100,000 to 400,000 residents.
We use data from several sources. To construct the cohorts of beneficiaries that we examine, we use data from the MedPAR, enrollment, and Part D Plan Characteristics Files (all files come from the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, CMS). MedPAR contains information on the inpatient hospital admissions of every Medicare beneficiary enrolled in TM, and since 2009, every beneficiary enrolled in MA. 4 We match these data, 4 The MA claims in MedPAR are the product of "no pay" bills submitted by hospitals to their Medicare contractor for the beneficiaries they treat (CMS uses the information on MA claims to determine the share of Medicare-financed days attributable to SSI beneficiaries, which in turn determines hospitals' eligibility for add-on payments such as Medicare DSH). Because hospitals are not directly paid based on the MA claims they submit, it is possible that hospitals underreport them, which could lead us to conclude that MA reduces hospitalization when it actually does not. However, CMS made submission of these bills mandatory effective January 7, 2008, with its Change Request 5647 (July 20, 2007, available at https://www.cms.gov/Regulations-and-Guidance/Guidance/Transmittals/downloads/R1311CP.pdf, accessed November 10, 2014). More broadly, concerns about reporting bias apply to all available largesample patient-level data that contain information on insurance status. The best alternative to MedPAR is patient-level data from the Healthcare Cost and Utilization Project State Inpatient Databases (HCUP SIDs, used in AHIP 2009 and Nicholas 2013) . The HCUP SIDs used in these analyses, in turn, are based on allpayer state hospital discharge files that contain information on the hospitals' expected source of payment (i.e., MA or TM). The validity of insurance coverage information in hospital discharge records is notoriously poor. Buchmueller, Allen, and Wright (2003) investigated the accuracy of "expected source of payment" in California OSHPD data, which is the best of the state discharge files. They found significant coding errors on payment source in OSHPD, which were especially pronounced for elderly Medicare beneficiaries. They concluded that OSHPD provided essentially no information on type of insurance for patients over age 65.
at the beneficiary level, with data from the enrollment file, which contains information on demographic characteristics (age, gender, race, and county of residence), monthly information on whether the beneficiary was enrolled in MA or TM, and (when applicable) date of death from Social Security records. For beneficiaries enrolled in MA, we determine the type of MA plan in which they enroll with the Part D Plan Characteristics File. We exclude beneficiaries enrolled in private fee-for-service (PFFS) plans because these are characteristically different from other types of MA plans. According to the Kaiser Family Foundation (2007), PFFS plans most closely resemble a privately administered version of TM and share few characteristics with other types of MA plans. In particular, PFFS plans are exempt from many of Medicare's requirements for other types of MA plans, such as employing provider networks or conducting utilization management. In any event, Medicare has largely phased out PFFS plans, so estimating their effects is no longer relevant to policy. Starting in January of 2009, we follow beneficiaries aged 65-99 for 12, 24, or 36 months who were enrolled in Medicare for all of the months that they were alive. We exclude beneficiaries who were missing any outcome or control variables (described below) or moved to a different county during their period of observation. We assign beneficiaries MA status based on the share of observation-months they were enrolled in MA, conditional on being alive.
We match to our primary data information on geographic areas for 2009 from other sources. First, we obtained information on the county composition and population of MSAs from the Census Bureau website.
5 Second, we obtained information on the characteristics of counties from Area Resource Files in order to investigate the extent to which counties in MSAs above versus below the urban floor had similar incomes and numbers of physicians and specialists. Third, we obtained information on commercial managed care enrollment rates from InterStudy. Fourth, we constructed zip code-level measures of hospital market competitiveness (measured by a Herfindahl-Hirschman index) and the density of hospital market characteristics (for-profit/nonprofit/public, teaching, system, and hospital-size status) using Medicare data according to the method in Baker, Bundorf, and Kessler (2014) . Fifth, we obtained county-level information from the CMS website on the number of Medicare beneficiaries, 6 the composition of MA enrollment by plan type, 7 and the county-average risk score, 8 to investigate the extent to which beneficiaries in counties above versus below the urban floor had similar health status. Table 1 presents means of our dependent variables for all nonrural Medicare beneficiaries and beneficiaries from MSAs with population of 100,000-400,000. For beneficiaries from MSAs in this population range, it also presents means by county floor The middle panel of the table presents differences in MA enrollment and hospital use by floor status for beneficiaries that we follow for 24 months. As the time horizon over which beneficiaries are followed grows from 12 to 24 months, the difference by floor status in MA enrollment remains roughly constant. Differences in mortality and utilization grow proportionally to their means, but their statistical significance remains unchanged. For example, the 24-month mortality of beneficiaries from counties above the urban floor threshold was 1.5 percentage points (0.0909−0.0924) lower than beneficiaries from counties below the floor (p = 0.288). As the bottom panel shows, this result persists as the time horizon grows from 24 to 36 months. Table 2 presents means and standard deviations (where relevant) of the exogenous characteristics of individuals and counties above and below the floor. According to Table 2 , in terms of most (although not all) important covariates, above-and belowthreshold counties are not statistically distinguishable. Individual demographics are similar; the regional composition of above-floor counties is more Northeastern and Southern, although not statistically different at conventional significance levels. The risk scores for the two groups-Medicare's best guess as to the groups' expected medical spending-are virtually identical, as are the number of Medicare beneficiaries, doctors, and specialists per capita. There are some notable differences in the two types of counties. Most striking, of course, is the difference in their size. The average beneficiary in a below-threshold county lives in a significantly smaller MSA than one in an above-threshold county. This is relevant because other work shows that small urban areas had fewer MA options than large areas even before urban floors were established (Pope et al. 2006, Tables 3-4) . There are other relevant differences between the groups, also likely related to size. Above-threshold counties have higher median income ($47,593 versus $45,043, p = 0.038), although their poverty rates are not statistically distinguishable at conventional levels. Their hospital markets are more competitive (i.e., significantly lower Herfindahl-Hirschman indices). Their residents are also more likely to be admitted to large (301 or more beds) and A teaching hospitals. The extent to which these factors explain differences in MA enrollment or outcomes is an important question to which we now turn.
IV. Econometric Models and Results
We begin by estimating reduced-form individual-level models of the effect of floor status on MA enrollment and outcomes. For beneficiary i (who lives in zip code z and county c), these models specify MA enrollment (MA izc ); number of hospital days (N izc ); and probability of hospital admission (H izc ), readmission (R izc ), or death (D izc ) as a linear function of county floor status, demographic characteristics, and zip code and county characteristics:
where FLR c is a variable denoting whether county c is in an MSA with population >250,000; X izc are indicator variables for the gender and race of the beneficiary; MKT zc are zip code-level hospital market characteristics, including the HerfindahlHirschman index (including and not including system hospitals as commonly owned), a hospital capacity index, and the density of for-profit, nonprofit (reference group is public), teaching, system, 100-299 bed and 300+ bed (reference group is <100 bed) hospitals; W c are the county's MSA's population in 2000 (on which its floor status is based, and in selected models, its square), 9 average Medicare beneficiary risk score, commercial managed care penetration, number of Medicare beneficiaries, physicians and specialists per capita, median income, poverty rate, and land area; and ε izc is an error term that we allow to be arbitrarily correlated within each county.
One way to assess the magnitude of the effect of floor status on utilization or mortality is to scale it by the magnitude of its effect on MA enrollment. In particular, the ratio of the effect of floor status on an outcome to the effect of floor on MA enrollment is the implied Wald estimate of the effect of MA. However, interpreting the Wald estimate as the causal effect of moving an individual from TM to MA requires two additional assumptions, both of which may be incorrect. First, it assumes that there are no spillovers from one individual's MA enrollment to others' outcomes. Second, it assumes that the local average treatment effect identified off of individuals in counties subject to the floor applies across the entire distribution of beneficiaries.
To allow for spillovers and parameterize the relationships between floor status, MA enrollment, and outcomes, we specify a nonlinear county-level model. Bhattacharya, Goldman, and McCaffrey (2006) show that the preferred model of an individual-level process with a binary outcome and an endogenous binary explanatory variable, especially for relatively rare events like mortality, is a bivariate probit model. This work implies that the preferred functional form for a county-level model of a proportion of a binary outcome with an endogenous proportional explanatory variable is a fractional bivariate probit. A fractional bivariate probit allows for outcomes in the interval [0,1] rather than outcomes that must be either 0 or 1. Wooldridge (2011 Wooldridge ( , 2012 shows that the expected value of the fractional response has the same form as the response probability in the conventional bivariate probit model, and that the QML estimator (with robust standard errors) is consistent. Thus, we follow Greene (2012, Section 17.5.5) and specify
, and 
Like all ML models, the estimates are, in part, identified by the nonlinearity of the model's functional form, although in this case we also have the exclusion restriction that the floor (conditional on MSA population and other controls) only affects hospital utilization or mortality through MA enrollment. In the tables below, we report the marginal effects of MA c on D c , H c , and R c , and of selected elements of W c on MA c , D c , H c , and R c , evaluated at their average values. Table 3 presents OLS estimates of equation 1 that quantify the effect of FLR c and selected elements of W c on MA izc and D izc for the 12 and 24 months following the beneficiaries' cohort entry. For ease of interpretation, effects in this and subsequent tables (except for models of hospital days) are reported in percentage points, that is, on a scale from 0 to 100. The table reports heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors allowing for arbitrary clustering within counties. According to column 1, residence in an urban floor county increases the probability that a beneficiary will be enrolled in MA in the 12 following months by 8.3 percentage points (standard error 2.6 percentage points). According to column 2, residence in a floor county decreases the probability of 12-month mortality by 0.24 percentage points (standard error 0.10 percentage points). On a base of 12-month mortality of 4.3 percentage points (Table 1) , this amounts to 5.6 percent less mortality in aboveversus below-floor counties (0.24 ÷ 4.3). Columns 3 and 4 show that this result is not sensitive to the inclusion of a quadratic term in MSA population. Columns 5-6 show that the magnitude of the effect of the urban floor on MA enrollment remains roughly constant as the period of follow-up grows from 12 to 24 months. Although the effect on mortality grows in absolute terms, it declines slightly as a proportion of the average: on a base of 9.2 percentage points (Table 1) , 24-month mortality is 5.7 percent (0.52 ÷ 9.2) lower in above-versus below-floor counties. Columns 7-8 show that as the period of follow-up grows from 24 to 36 months, the incremental effect of the urban floor on mortality continues to decline slowly. On a base of 14 percentage points (Table 1) , 36-month mortality is 4.7 percent (0.66 ÷ 14) lower in above-versus below-floor counties. The Wald estimates of the effect of MA implied by the OLS coefficients reported in Table 3 are quite large (assuming no spillovers and that the effects generalize to full range of possible MA penetration), although smaller than the effect implied by the raw differences in means from Table 1 . For example, the coefficients in columns 1 and 2 imply that moving an individual from TM to MA is associated with a 12-month mortality decline of 2.9 percentage points (0.241 ÷ 0.083). On a base rate of 4.3 percentage points per year (Table 1) , this amounts to an effect size of 67.4 percent (2.9 ÷ 4.3). By comparison, the differences in means in Table 1 imply that moving an individual from TM to MA is associated with a 12-month mortality decline of 10 points (0.7 ÷ 0.07), although the 95 percent confidence bounds around the mortality effect include zero. Table 4 presents marginal effects from the bivariate probit model specified by equation 2, along with heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. Column 1 of the table shows that residents of urban floor counties are 6.8 percentage points (standard error 2.4 percentage points) more likely to enroll in MA for the 12 months following cohort entry, which is similar to the OLS estimate from Table 3 . Column 2 shows that increases in the proportion of beneficiaries enrolled in MA lead to lower county-average mortality. The size of the estimated effect of moving an individual from TM to MA is considerably smaller than the Wald estimate implied by the OLS coefficients. Moving an individual from TM to MA is associated with 0.67 percentage points lower 12-month mortality (standard error 0.17, column 2), which translates into an effect size of 15.6 percent (0.67 ÷ 4.3, Table 1 ). Columns 3 and 4 show that this result is not sensitive to the inclusion of a quadratic term in MSA population. Columns 5-8 show that the effect size is roughly similar for 24-and 36-month time horizons. For example, moving an individual from TM to MA is associated with 1.4 percentage points lower 24-month mortality (standard error 0.31, column 6), which translates into an effect size of 15.1 percent (1.39 ÷ 9.2, Table 1 ). Table 5 presents OLS and bivariate probit estimates of the effect of county floor status and MA on various measures of hospital utilization. Columns 1-4 present OLS estimates of equation 1 with MA izc , N izc , H izc , and R izc as the dependent variables. Column 1 replicates column 1 from Table 3 . The Wald estimates of the effect of MA implied by the OLS coefficients reported in Table 5 , like the Wald estimates of the effect of MA from Table 3 , are quite large. For example, the coefficients in columns 1 and 3 imply that moving an Table 1) . Table 6 presents OLS estimates from two variants of equation 1 that explore the sensitivity of our results to our modeling choices. First, we reestimated models of MA enrollment, mortality, and utilization excluding the risk scores to investigate whether our estimated effects might be due to endogeneity in the scores' determination; results from these models are in columns 1-3. If MA plans encourage more intensive coding, and more intensive coding leads to higher risk scores (US GAO 2012), estimates conditional on risk score would be inconsistent. This could occur because of positive correlation between measurement error in the risk score and floor status; overstated risk scores for MA beneficiaries would make MA appear to have a greater beneficial effect on health than it actually did. However, we found little evidence to support this hypothesis. Excluding the risk scores from the model did not materially affect the magnitude or significance of our estimates. Second, we reestimated the models on a sample of counties from MSAs with populations closer to the 250,000 urban floor threshold; results from these models are in columns 4-6. Limiting our analysis to individuals resident in counties from MSAs with populations of 200,000 to 300,000 reduced the number of counties in our sample from 413 to 99. At the smaller bandwidth, the effect of floor status on MA enrollment, mortality, and hospital utilization remained similar in magnitude (although the effect on days in the hospital became statistically significant). Table 7 reports results from a placebo test of effect of county floor status on individuallevel Medicare Advantage enrollment and mortality. The placebo test estimates the effect of residence in an urban floor county in 2000, the latest year in which the urban floor was not in effect. The dependent variables are defined based on enrollment and mortality information from the 12 calendar months of the cohort year, rather than a longer period, to ensure that the results from the 2000 cohort were not exposed to the effects of the urban floor. The models are similar to those specified by equation 1, except that they do not include a risk score, because Medicare Advantage did not fully risk-adjust payments until 2007 (Newhouse and McGuire 2014) . Table 7 shows that in 2000, before the urban floor took effect, residence in a county with population between 250,000 and 400,000 had essentially no effect on either Medicare Advantage enrollment or mortality, relative to residence in a county with population between 100,000 and 249,999: the point estimates are very small and statistically insignificant. This result is invariant to the inclusion of a quadratic term in MSA population. This analysis suggests that the effect of floor status from later years is indeed measuring the effect of the increased benchmark payments rather than some other difference between individuals or counties that is correlated with county size. 
V. Conclusion
Medicare currently allows beneficiaries to choose between a publicly administered health plan known as Traditional Medicare (TM), and privately administered plans, known as Medicare Advantage (MA). Assessing the relative performance of TM and MA is an important issue, with first-order implications for not only national health and fiscal policy but also economic theory. However, because enrollment in MA is optional, evaluating the MA program is difficult. Beneficiaries who choose MA are observably healthier than those who choose TM. Because observational data on health are notoriously incomplete, and unobservable differences are likely positively correlated with observables, conventional analyses of MA's impact are potentially subject to selection bias-bias that would tend to make MA look more beneficial than it actually is. In this paper, we offer a new approach to identifying the effects of MA. We use a discontinuity in the rules governing MA payments to private health plans that gives greater payments to plans that cover beneficiaries who live in counties that are part of metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) with populations of 250,000 or more. The sharp difference in payment rates at this population cutoff creates a greater incentive for plans to enroll beneficiaries in MA in counties just above versus just below the cutoff. The induced incremental enrollment, in turn, allows us to identify the effect of MA on the use of health services and the quality of care.
We find that the higher payment rate in these "urban floor" counties leads to statistically significantly higher MA enrollment, lower rates of hospital use, and lower mortality. The magnitudes of our estimates, although large, are similar to those from previous work that uses different identification strategies. Baicker, Chernew, and Robbins (2013) report that a 100 percentage point increase in MA enrollment is associated with 0.498 fewer hospital days per person (their Table 7 ); on a base of 0.650 days per person in 2009 (their Table 1 ), this translates into an effect size of −76.6 percent. In comparison, we estimate that moving an individual from TM to MA is associated with 1.1 fewer hospital days per year (0.093 ÷ 0.083, Table 5 , columns 1 and 2). On a base rate of 1.6 days per year (Table 1) , this amounts to an effect size of 68.8 percent (1.1 ÷ 1.6).
The magnitudes of our estimated effects from county-level fractional bivariate probit models are considerably smaller than the magnitudes implied by our reduced-form individual-level OLS models. For example, the reduced-form individual-level OLS models show that moving from a below-to above-floor county is associated with an 8.3 percentage point increase in 12-month MA enrollment and a decrease in 12-month mortality of 0.24 percentage points, yielding an implied Wald estimate of the effect of MA of 2.9 percentage points. By contrast, the county-level bivariate probits show an effect of MA on 12-month mortality of 0.67 percentage points-about one-quarter as large. This difference may be due to the assumption implicit in the bivariate probit that the responsiveness of the probit score is smaller at the tails of the distribution. In other words, the bivariate probits do not impose the assumption (that the Wald estimate imposes) that the local treatment effect estimated around the floor applies to the entire distribution of beneficiaries-an assumption that may be incorrect.
Moreover, interpreting either the Wald or the bivariate probit estimates as the effect of moving an individual beneficiary from TM to MA assumes that there are no spillovers from the MA program. Previous research has shown that this assumption is unlikely to be correct; thus, the impact of moving from TM to MA, excluding spillovers, is likely smaller than our estimates suggest. For this reason, we interpret our estimates as a market-wide effect rather than the effect of MA enrollment on an individual beneficiary.
Although we find that increases in MA enrollment lead to fewer hospitalizations and less mortality, our results do not allow us to assess the effect of the program's expansion on social welfare, since the outcomes we observe do not nearly exhaust the outcomes that a public decision maker would consider. In addition, because the incremental MA enrollment underlying our estimates is induced by higher payment rates, we cannot determine the extent to which better outcomes are due to better management by private health plans, holding real resource use constant, or to additional services provided to beneficiaries as a result of the higher rates (and associated more generous coverage). Indeed, other work has found that increasing payment to MA plans increases the probability that beneficiaries will enroll in a plan with prescription drug coverage (Gowrisankaran, Town, and Barrette 2011) and reduces the rate at which their beneficiaries are hospitalized for certain conditions (Nicholas 2011) , which suggests that additional services might be important. By implication, we cannot say whether MA plans would provide better care than TM, were they to be paid less than they were during our study period. This limitation of our study design is important. The ACA significantly reduces payments to MA plans in the future, especially those in areas with benchmarks that are above TM spending levels-which is obviously related to county floor status. For this reason, our findings cannot be directly extrapolated to the future performance of MA.
To determine whether expanding MA is welfare-improving would require at least two additional pieces of information: (1) estimates of the effect of MA on the total cost of care, including prescription drugs and outpatient services; and (2) the share of floor-induced increases in the benchmark that represent real resources consumed by health plans or beneficiaries, versus the share that are transfers, including funds returned to Medicare (i.e., the 25 percent of the difference between the bid and the benchmark), gains to plans' shareholders, or lower MA premiums.
Along with such welfare analysis, future work might evaluate the performance of MA in the post-ACA world, where payments to MA plans will be less generous on average than they were historically, and the performance of MA under competitive bidding. Finally, future research might seek to investigate how MA interacts with the competitiveness of hospital, physician, and insurance markets, to determine the circumstances under which the gains from MA that we find would be most likely to be achievable.
